The Afghanistan War Commission recently convened a session in the United States Senate to review the U.S. and allied military and political presence in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008. Several high-ranking former officials offered a candid critique of the early years of international involvement, citing deep flaws in strategy, coordination, and governance.
General David Barno, who commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2003, highlighted a severe disconnect between political goals and military operations. “I arrived in Afghanistan in October 2003, almost six months after the invasion of Iraq,” Barno said. “At that time, the country was under the interim leadership of Hamid Karzai, but actual power rested with warlords who possessed more tanks, rockets, and artillery than the central government.”
Henry A. Crumpton, former CIA mission chief in Afghanistan, echoed concerns over systemic corruption and missed opportunities for reform. He pointed to the failure of the U.S. strategy not just in nation-building, but in fostering long-term self-reliance. “Corruption expanded rapidly,” he said. “The SIGAR report, at 164 pages, paints a damning picture—tens of billions of dollars were misused. It wasn’t just about lost money; it was about cultivating a dangerous level of dependency.”
Andrew Natsios, former head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, added that while large sums were spent on infrastructure, the impact was minimal due to poor execution and rampant corruption. “No more than 25 percent of the cabinet ministers were actually qualified for their roles,” Natsios said. “The rest were tribal figures appointed to form political alliances and to be monitored in Kabul.”
The U.S. and its allies entered Afghanistan in 2001 in response to global terrorism. After two decades of conflict, the final American troops departed on August 31, 2021.
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